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ABSTRACT.  The Eleatic Principle denies the existence of  causally inert 
entities. In this paper, I discuss a particular justification of  the principle - that 
causally inert entities have no explanatory value in science. I argue against this 
justification, showing that non-causal explanations and entities do important 
work in scientific explanations. I then propose that the Eleatic should instead 
adopt an alternative principle, one where explanatory power conditions the 
existence of  postulated entities. To flesh out the principle, I present an account 
of  explanation, connecting it with directed dependency, arguing that grounding 
dependence, not just causal dependence, can generate explanation. Finally, I 
point to a theory that could minimize the ontological commitments entailed by 
accepting the new principle.  1
      INT ROD U C TI ON 
Ontology is about what exists. Sometimes, philosophers design tests, or set up 
principles, intended to check if  some postulated entities exist or not. If  they 
exist, they are allowed in our ontology, if  they don’t they’re not. The principle 
I will be concerned with; ’the Eleatic Principle’, is a criterion for existence 
which take causality as the dividing line. This principle states that causal 
activity, or the ability to partake in causal processes, is prerequisite of  
existence. As such, the principle can be used in arguments against the 
existence of  various entities: mental properties, abstract entities, mathematical 
properties, mereological composites etc.  That way, it serves the purpose of  2
narrowing the scope of  ontological concern, making it attractive for minimalist 
metaphysics. In this paper, I want to do two things: (1) Question a particular 
justification for the principle; that only causal entities play explanatory roles in 
science. I argue that this justification is weak, at best. My argument rests on the 
fact that natural science sometimes non-trivially uses non-causal explanations 
and entities. (2) Suggest that the Eleatic, instead of  using causal potency, 
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should distinguish between existing and non existing entities based on their 
explanatory powers. In a slogan: whatever uniquely explains, exist.  
Some clarification of  the assumptions in this paper and what it doesn’t 
claim are in order. I am not arguing against every justification for the Eleatic 
principle that has been offered, so even though the particular one I do argue 
against might loose its justification, there are other options available.  Any 3
further mentioning of  ‘the’ justification should be read with this in mind. 
Furthermore, I will assume that, in addition to explanatory value, the Eleatic 
accepts ontological parsimony as a theoretical virtue. All else being equal, less 
ontology is better. Finally, a note on causality. First, the causal order is the 
temporal order such that an effect precedes its cause. Second, I take causation 
to be a strict partial order (irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive). Third, causal 
relations are explanatory relations, and fourth, absences and omissions are not 
part of  the causal order. These claims will be fleshed out in section 3.1 and 3.2 
In the first section I present the Eleatic principle as well as a particular 
justification for it. In section two I present an argument which states that the 
justification has wrongly assumed that only causal explanations are needed in 
science. The argument consists of  two cases in which non-causal explanation 
figure in complete scientific explanations. In section three I suggest that the 
justification for the Eleatic principle instead should be involved in the content 
of  the principle itself, so that postulated entities with explanatory value are 
those which count as existing. I present a theory of  explanation and and how it 
connects to dependence, claiming that both causation and grounding 
dependence are connected with explanation. Finally, in section four, I look at 
an argument - that grounding is metaphysical causation - reducing the 
ontology entailed by the new principle, and suggest that this position ought to 
be considered given ontological parsimony.  
1 .    JUST IFY IN G TH E ELE AT IC PR INC IPLE 
One reason for adopting the Eleatic Principle is that you are a scientific realist. 
A central tenet of  most versions of  scientific realism is naturalism which roughly 
 For an epistemic justification, see for instance Colin Cheyne (1998). 3
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states that ‘nothing at all exists except the single world of  space and 
time.’ (Armstrong, 1989, p. 3).  Postulating entities that lie outside of  4
naturalism’s scope then, must from this perspective be met with skepticism: 
To postulate entities which lie beyond our world of  space and time is, in 
general, to make a speculative, uncertain, postulation. The postulation 
may perhaps be defended if  it can be presented as explaining some or all 
of  the spatio-temporal phenomena. But if  the entities postulated lie 
beyond our world, and in addition have no causal or nomic connections 
with it, then the postulation has no explanatory value. Hence (a further 
step of  course) we ought to deny the existence of  such entities. 
(Armstrong, 1989, p. 7–8)  [Author italics]  5
Only entities with explanatory value are justified, and only causal entities can 
be explanatory. This suggests that Armstrong thinks that causal explanations 
are the only explanations that can provide information about the natural 
world. Furthermore, all such explanations of  spatio-temporal phenomena will, 
according to Armstrong, be a scientific endeavor: 
The nature of  space and time is to be discovered a posteriori. It is a 
matter for science. (Armstrong, 1997, p. 6)
These claims, that entities need to be causal to be explanatory, and that 
explanations in natural science can account for the nature of  space and time, 
together make up the justification for accepting the Eleatic Principle: 
The Eleatic Principle: Everything that exists makes a difference to the 
causal powers of  something. (Armstrong 1997, p.41)
It’s important to distinguish between the principle and its justification, so in 
order to be clear, I intend to argue against the justification for the principle, 
which I take to be the following: 
Eleatic Justification: Non-causal entities have no explanatory value in 
science. 
 I couldn’t hope to provide a unanimously held account of  naturalism here, partly because I 4
don’t think that such unanimity exist, but mostly because I think the one represented by 
Armstrong suffices for my purposes. I will throughout this paper assume that naturalism in 
some form or other is true and that we should strive to keep our theories compatible with it. 
 As Colywan (1998, p. 7) notes, explanatory value is often part of  justifying scientific realism, 5
so using it to determine the scope of  that realism seems natural. 
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The Eleatic principle expressed above is a revised version that Armstrong uses 
in order to ‘[g]et around annoying counter-instances to the simpler 
formula’ (Armstrong, 1997, p.41), referring to Graham Oddie’s critique of  an 
earlier formulation of  the principle, objecting that the causal relation itself  is 
causally inert, by which infinite regress threatens (Oddie, 1981). In his (1997) 
Armstrong explicitly uses the Eleatic Principle to argue against the existence of  
uninstantiated universals, but it could just as easily be used in arguments 
against any proposed entity, premised on the idea that they could not make a 
causal difference in the world of  space and time.  
The Eleatic Principle is sometimes only implicitly referred to or mentioned 
as Alexander’s Dictum, in the latter case most often as a principle in philosophy 
of  mind considered as a premise in over-determination arguments.  Given that 6
the Eleatic principle is used to do some important philosophical work, it seems 
motivated to examine its justification. For reasons of  scope, clarity and 
simplicity, I will be primarily concerned with the formulation of  the principle 
stated above. I take it that the formulation above is sufficiently uncontroversial 
and sufficiently similar to the versions discussed by Colywan (1998), Ellis 
(1990), Cowling (2014, 2015), Hudson (2003), Elder (2003), etc.  7
In the next section, I will argue that the Eleatic justification is incorrect in 
asserting that only causal entities have explanatory value, and I will give two 
examples of  non-causal contribution to explanation in science.  
2 .    NON-CAUSAL EXPLA NATIO NS IN SCI E N CE 
Although causal explanations are abundant in science, not every scientific 
explanation is entirely causal, or so I’ll argue. In support of  such an argument 
I want to present two cases of  non-causal contribution to scientific 
 As an example of  the former: in his 1990 book Truth & Objectivity B.D Ellis appears to 6
commit to the principle when proposing that ‘only those entities implicated in causal process 
explanations exist, such as protons, electrons, and the fundamental forces, but not those 
deriving from model-theoretic explanations, such as space-time points, propositions, numbers, 
sets or idealizations’. Under the flag of  Alexander’s Dictum the principle has occurred in Hudson 
(2003), Cargile (2003), Elder (2003), and Kim (1993).
 I use ‘uncontroversial’ here to denote the formulation of  the principle, not the principle per 7
se. The controversiality of  the principle hinges on whatever background commitments you 
have. A mathematical realist ought to think it’s controversial, not so for a scientific realist. 
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explanation, as well as some endorsements of  the general idea that non-causal 
explanations have value in science. Let’s start with the latter.  
Skow (2014) argues that all explanations of  events are causal but admits that 
grounding explanations (equivalent to in-virtue-of  locutions) can be found in 
science:  8
[…] scientists also often aim to give in-virtue-of  explanations. When a 
chemist explains why a pane of  glass is fragile by describing its molecular 
structure, she is giving an in-virtue-of  explanation. (Skow, 2014, p. 447) 
Facing this challenge, Skow simply revises his thesis to state that ‘[A]ll 
explanations of  events other than in-virtue-of  explanations are causal’ (Skow, 
2014, p. 447). I will take his revised thesis as an indication that he believes non-
causal explanations can be found in science.   9
Audi (2012) endorses the idea that explanations sometimes can be, and are, 
non-causal, and claims that explanation connects to dependency:  
[…] being spherical does not cause things to have the power to roll. Nor is 
being spherical identical with the power to roll, since the power to roll is 
a power also of  cylinders, which are not spherical. So the fact that a 
given thing is spherical non-causally determines the fact that it has the 
power to roll. (Audi, 2012, p. 104) [Author italics] 
Schaffer is perhaps the strongest advocate of  non-causal explanation (here 
referred to in the form of  metaphysical explanation), citing the potential role it 
could play for physicalists:   10
Metaphysicians—led by Fine—have only recently (re-)turned to a notion 
of  grounding that has the structural features appropriate for backing the 
explanation of  the less fundamental from the more fundamental, thus 
 Skow (2014, p. 447) accepts a liberal definition of  events, and says it’s uncontroversial that 8
‘like ordinary material objects, events have spatial and temporal locations. It makes sense to 
ask where and when an event happened.’ 
 That all explanations of  events are causal is compatible with the argument I am pursuing 9
here, given that events are a subdomain of  entities. 
 Further examples: Schaffer (2012) states that ‘[T]o explain a macro-effect from a micro-10
cause, one needs a “diagonal” explanation that crosses both times and levels.’, Pexton (2012) 
argues that ‘An illustrative case study in how the abstraction away from causal details to non-
causal structural features can be explanatory can be found in the explanation of  a surprising 
generality across the biological world, an allometric scaling law.’ Other concrete examples, 
including ‘Antipodal weather patterns’ and ‘the FitzGerald-Lorentz contraction’, have been 
given by Colywan (1998).
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(re-)gaining the ideology needed to discuss metaphysical explanation, and 
articulate explanatory versions of  views such as physicalism. (Schaffer, 
forthcoming) [Author italics] 
The above citations are meant to illustrate that non-causal explanations are 
things taken seriously by metaphysicians, but they provide little or no evidence 
of  such explanations appearing in science. The passages above seem to be 
about the very idea that non-causal explanations can figure importantly in 
science, but they do not demonstrate it. Now, I want to turn to the two 
concrete examples which are supposed to show that non-causal explanations in 
fact do appear in science. 
CH E M I C A L 
In Schaffer (2016a) we find an example of  a hybrid-explanation, invoking both 
causation and grounding, used to explain why a gas has certain properties at a 
time (t1) in terms of  the molecular motions by its molecules at a previous time 
(t0): 
Fig. 1 Diagonal hybrid explanation (Schaffer, 2016a, p. 89) 
This explanation states that the mean molecular motions at t1 are accounted 
for by the causal relation to the mean molecular motions at t0, thus providing 
a diachronical and external story about the two states. More importantly (for 
my purposes), the explanation states that the heat of  the gas at t1 can be 
accounted for synchronically and internally. Holding the mean molecular 
motions at t1 fixed, the heat of  the gas at t1 is guaranteed, that is, the gas has 
the heat properties it has at t1 in virtue of the mean molecular motion at t1. 
There might be a worry that the entities involved in the non-causal 
explanation are all causally potent, so it appears as if  this example fails to 
demonstrate that non-causal entities have explanatory value in science. But it is 
still true that the complete explanation need the grounding relation backing it, 
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otherwise we would be unable to explain the heat of  the gas at t1. If  strictly 
causal, the explanation could only reference the mean molecular motions at t1, 
but this clearly isn’t enough to explain the heat of  the gas at t1. Since science 
uses metaphysical explanations, and such explanations are non-causal 
explanations, this raises a red flag against the Eleatic justification. This 
explanation (as well as some of  the general endorsements above) make explicit 
reference to the grounding relation, a relation which I will examine more 
thoroughly in section three, but for now it suffices to say that the full 
explanation need more than the causal story to be complete. Schaffer stresses 
that hybrid-explanations are part of  his explanatory unionism, in which there 
aren’t several types of  explanations (causal explanation, metaphysical 
explanation and mathematical explanation to name a few), but only 
explanation simpliciter, that is, one kind of  explanation. I will, for now, remain 
neutral to the explanatory unionism advocated by Schaffer, as I think nothing 
important in my argument against the Eleatic justification rests on this point.   11
MATHEMATI CA L 
Why do bees build their honeycombs out of  hexagonal cells? According to the 
theory of  evolution, natural selection favors the bees that build their 
honeycombs in the most efficient manner, minimizing energy output and 
maximizing utility of  wax. This is an empirical fact, but one that can be 
partially explained mathematically: 
The Honeycomb Theorem: A hexagonal grid is the most efficient way to 
divide a Euclidian plane into regions of  equal area with least total 
perimeter. (Hales, 2001, p. 4) 
Note, however, that this theorem is not sufficient for the full explanation. Other 
parts are needed, such as the fact that the bees that uses less wax tend to be 
fitter than other bees. Nevertheless, the theorem is an indispensable part of  the 
explanation. Simply providing the causal history of  how the bees came to 
build hexagonally shaped cells omit explaining why they do so. Consider this 
explanation of  why bees build their honeycombs out of  hexagonal cells: first, 
the bees might have used a triangular shape but at some point, the bees tried 
 I will, however, revisit Schaffer’s unionism in section 3.1.11
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new shapes, for example squares. The ‘square bees’ were more efficient and 
hence fitter, thereby out-reproducing the triangle bees. Down the line, some of  
the square bees started building hexagonally shaped cells, which by the same 
process led to the out-reproducing of  the bees that continued making squares. 
This causal explanation misses a crucial point: it’s irrelevant to the final 
outcome what sequence of  shapes the bees tried out in the past. No matter 
how the causal story might go, the Honeycomb Theorem explains why the 
bees would always come to build their honeycombs with hexagonal cells (Lyon, 
2011). A full explanation of  why bees build their honeycombs out of  
hexagonal cells is a package-deal containing both empirical and mathematical 
facts, i.e. both causal and non-causal explanation. Furthermore, this 
explanation explicitly references non-causal entities such as Euclidian planes.   12
Before moving on to section three, let’s take stock. First, I presented the 
Eleatic Principle and a particular justification for it - that non-causal entities 
have no explanatory value in science. I then argued that this justification could 
be substantially weakened, by showing that both non-causal explanations and 
non-causal entities make non-trivial contributions in science. The Eleatic 
principle can not, if  I’m right, be justified by the claim that only causal entities 
have explanatory value. But I don’t think that Armstrong is entirely wrong 
either. I do think there is something to the idea of  letting explanatory value 
play a part in restricting the ontological domain, and in what remains, I will 
try to argue for a principle which places the responsibility for our ontology on 
the theoretical virtue of  explanatory value. For if  it is explanatory value that 
we care about, why not use that as the ruler of  whether some postulated entity 
exist or not?  
3 .    A N EW PR I N CI PL E 
Causal explanations are good explanations, but if  they aren’t the only type 
needed for a complete scientific account of  the natural world, there is little 
 I should note that mathematical explanations of  mathematical facts are more common than 12
mathematical explanations of  empirical facts, the former an example of  pure non-causal 
explanation. It is, however, controversial as to whether or not such explanations are scientific 
in the right sense, since their scope arguably falls outside the domain of  space and time. 
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reason for us to restrict ourselves to only them. What other types of  
explanations are there, and how might they be connected to ontology? In this 
section, I will explore the view that explanations are epistemic facts or 
sentences that are backed by some concrete relation between entities.  Notice 13
that ‘concrete relations’ is open, so that an explanation could be backed by any 
relation with the right features, causal or otherwise. Another way to put it is 
that ‘explanations track dependence relations’ (Kim, 1994, p. 68 [Author italics]). To 
be clear, it’s the entities ‘picked out’ by the explanations that I suggest we allow 
in our ontology, so that for an entity to have ‘explanatory power’ is for it to 
participate in a relation that back an explanation. With this in mind, I suggest 
the following principle: 
Explanatory Principle: An entity is to be counted as real if  and only if  it has 
explanatory power. 
Since this principle will restrict ontology based on explanatory power, and 
causal explanations are good explanations, causally relevant entities will 
probably still make up most of  our ontological domain. This means that we 
can keep the intuitive pull of  the Eleatic principle and its motivation, while 
recognizing that one of  the defining features of  causal entities - their 
explanatory power - might not be exclusively reserved for them. Furthermore, 
the principle does not necessarily or logically entail that the domain of  entities 
existing according to it must contain non-causal contributes, but only that the 
existence of  non-causal entities cannot be ruled out prima facie. If  someone 
were to reduce all explanations to causal explanations, the domain of  existing 
entities entailed by the Explanatory principle would contain exactly the ones 
which were entailed by the Eleatic principle, but such a conclusion must be the 
result of  careful analytic investigation, instead of  being merely assumed. The 
next subsection will try to flesh out a view of  explanation, and its connection 
to dependence relations.  
 That explanation is to be understood as an epistemic notion is not entirely uncontroversial. 13
Schaffer (2016a, p. 84) seems to think that they are epistemic when stating that causal 
explanation is ‘an abstract pattern over facts or sentences’, while Raven (2012) suggests that 
metaphysical explanations are ontic facts that stand in the right structural relation. 
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3 .1    WH AT A R E E XPLANAT ION S? 
As we saw in section two, scientific explanations are sometimes both causal 
and metaphysical. Kim (1994) makes the proposal that the objective correlates 
of  any type of  explanation are dependency relations, taking a broad ontological 
category of  relata to partake in such relations: events, states, facts, properties, 
regularities between events, and entities. Causal dependence will be part of  the 
dependency relations (ranging over events), but Kim cautiously suggest that we 
may view other types of  dependencies as explanatory:  
Socrates expires in the prison, and Xanthippe becomes a widow. The 
widowing of  Xanthippe depends on the death of  Socrates, and this is 
perhaps still another kind of  dependence. There is a widespread belief  in 
mind-body supervenience: the mentality of  a creature depends on its 
physical nature. […] These and other dependence relations may 
generate explanations - explanations of  mental phenomena in terms of  
their underlying neurobiology, and of  evaluative facts in terms of  the 
non-evaluative facts on which they supervene. (Kim, 1994, p. 67-68) 
Kim is basically saying that we should focus our attention to the shared feature 
of  explanation - dependency. Kim’s proposal thus links the explanational to 
the ontic, generalizing that relation to the claim I introduced above: 
‘explanations track dependence relations’. As noted in section two, Schaffer (2016a, p. 
83-90) is sympathetic to the idea that explanation is a unified concept that can 
be backed with different dependency relations (although, he is more precise 
about the nature of  those dependencies: “[…] the relations that back 
explanation are the relations of  directed [contrastive] dependency”). He is thus 
denying that ‘causal explanation’ differs from ‘metaphysical explanation’ qua 
explanation, even though we might call an explanation metaphysical when 
backed by grounding, and causal when backed with causation. If  we accept 
this idea, then the scientific explanations in section two are not hybrid-
explanations in the sense that they utilize two different types of  explanation. 
More plausibly, they are explanations that utilize two different dependency 
relations. This has the consequence that the Explanatory principle will 
ontologically include all entities that are relata in the dependence relations that 
backs explanation.  
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But what does it mean to say that some dependency relation ‘backs’ 
explanation, and what are the formal features of  explanation? And is 
grounding apt to back explanation in the same way as causation, as I have 
assumed so far? 
I will work with the notion of  explanation as separated from ontology, a 
position argued for by Audi (2012b) and Schaffer (2012) amongst others, but 
not all will agree that they are distinct. For example, Raven (2012), and Fine 
(2012) take grounding to be a kind of  metaphysical explanation, thus unifying 
the two. This means that they wouldn’t acknowledge either explanatory 
unionism (that there is only explanation simpliciter) or the separation between 
explanation and grounding. In what follows, I will drop the debate about 
whether or not grounding and metaphysical explanation are separated and 
simply assume that explanation is distinct from, but closely connected with, the 
ontology it is about. Philosophers endorsing this separatist view often talk 
about explanation being backed by grounding (or causation).   14
Consider the following explanation: {Socrates} exists because Socrates 
exists. The relation between the explanandum and the explanans is often thought 
to be asymmetric, so as to avoid circular explanations. If  x explains y, y doesn’t 
explain x, so if  the explanation above is correct, then the explanation ‘Socrates 
exists because {Socrates} exists’ is incorrect. The correct explanation is backed 
with a dependency relation, namely the one between Socrates and {Socrates}: 
Socrates’ existence makes {Socrates} exist.  15
Besides being asymmetric, explanations are thought to be irreflexive, transitive 
and well-founded. They are irreflexive since nothing explains itself: the fact that 
my shirt is blue isn’t explained by the fact that my shirt is blue. They are 
transitive since if  x explains y, and y explains z, x (at least partially) explains z: 
 Note that the same relationship between explanation and grounding/causation is supposed 14
to be denoted by ‘tracking’. This means that Kim’s suggestion that explanations track 
dependencies is tantamount to saying that dependencies back explanation. 
 The relata in this explanation are intensionally co-extensive, making the explanation 15
hyperintensional. That explanations cans have this feature has led a lot of  philosophers (e.g. Fine, 
2012, Kim, 1993) to abandon supervenience as a candidate dependency relation underwriting 
explanation. Supervenience simply cannot account for asymmetric dependence when two 
entities are modally covariant, so therefore supervenience is not part of  the dependency 
relations that backs explanation. Consequently, that entities supervene is not enough to give 
them the explanatory value needed to be included in ontology, at least not by the Explanatory 
principle.
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if  I am late because I missed the bus, and I missed the bus because I overslept, 
then I am late because I overslept. Finally, explanations are well-founded, or; 
explanations terminate. If  explanations were to lack this feature, infinite 
regress threatens to make all explanations vacant or empty, but intuitively, they 
are not - explanations really do explain.   16
Imposing these restrictions on explanation seem both reasonable and 
plausible, and now we can start to investigate what kind of  dependency 
relations, or directed dependencies, that can back explanation. The general 
program is to find out which dependency relations that can back explanation 
so that we get an idea of  which kinds of  entities that have explanatory value. 
Exhausting all potential dependence relations would, however, be a task too 
big for this paper, so I will restrict my attention to causation and grounding as 
candidate dependency relations for backing explanation.  
3 .2    BACKING EX PLA NATIO NS 
CAUSATION 
First, let’s look at causal explanations. They are so widely accepted and 
intuitive that if  the Explanatory principle can’t pick out the entities involved in 
them, it clearly isn’t a good principle. Suppose that the throwing of  a rock 
caused the breaking of  the window. The breaking of  the window then 
depended on the throwing of  the rock, and this dependence seems asymmetric 
such that the breaking of  the window didn’t cause the throwing of  the rock. 
It’s also irreflexive such that the breaking of  the window didn’t cause itself. For 
transitivity, suppose that if  I get cut by the broken window, this is (at least 
partially) caused by the throwing of  the rock. This causal dependence back an 
explanation: the window broke because the rock was thrown. As with the 
causal dependence, the explanation seems asymmetric: the cause explains the 
effect but the effect cannot explain the cause, irreflexive; the effect isn’t 
 I take these formal features to be features of  explanation, but I do want to note that there 16
are other ways to understand explanation in general and metaphysical explanation in 
particular. See Hempel (1965) and Salmon (1986) for general accounts of  scientific 
explanation, and Thompson (forthcoming) for an account of  metaphysical explanation 
without a strict partial ordering.
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explained by itself, and transitive; that I cut myself  is (at least partially) 
explained by the throwing of  the rock.  
This causal explanation is backed by a causal relation, which means that the 
entities involved in that causal relation (for example the rock, the window and 
me) have explanatory value. According to the Explanatory principle, we 
should allow them in ontology. So far so good. But throughout this paper, I 
have invoked grounding as a relation that can also back explanation. What are 
the features of  grounding, and can grounding back explanation?  
GROUNDING 
Let’s take an example. Suppose I hurt my foot really badly and experience 
some intense pain. We could explain why I’m in pain by citing the causal 
history that led to the hurting of  my foot, for example me accidentally 
stumbling into the leg of  a table. But there seems to be an alternative 
explanation as to why I am in pain, one that cites my neural state at the time I 
am in pain. Both explanations seem accurate, but different: the causal one is 
temporal and gives a diachronical story about the events involved, the other 
one is synchronical and seems to be about what constitutes my pain, rather 
than what the cause for it was.  They are both, however, trying to explain the 17
same thing: why is it the case that I am in pain? The constitutive explanation is 
often talked about as an in-virtue-of  explanation, and it’s in-virtue-of  
explanations that I think we should back with grounding.  
Grounding, as I understand it, is a relation concerned with the ontological 
priority or fundamentality of  entities.  It connects the less to the more 18
fundamental, thereby providing structure to what there is. An illustrative 
example is that particles are more fundamental than chemicals, and chemicals 
 They also seem to hold counterfactually: if  I hadn’t stumped my foot into the table I 17
wouldn’t have been in pain, but if  I hadn’t been in the neural state that I was, I wouldn’t have 
been in pain either. 
 Other authors consider facts as the appropriate relata of  grounding relations. Facts have, 18
however, been interpreted differently. Audi (2012b, p. 3) writes ‘On my view, grounding is a 
singular relation between facts, understood as things having properties and standing in 
relations.  Facts, on this conception, are not true propositions, but obtaining states of  affairs.’ 
Schaffer (2016, p. 75) takes facts to denote something more akin to our everyday 
understanding of  the word, and instead ops for entities being the relata of  grounding since 
they denote ‘some concrete elements of  physical reality’. I think the differences between 
Schaffer’s entities and Audi’s facts so understood are fairly insignificant - they both seem to 
involve concrete physical elements.
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are more fundamental than plants, which can be rephrased as the idea that 
plants depend on chemicals, and chemicals depend on particles. Dependence-
talk is a natural way to express the idea that reality has levels, and grounding is 
supposed to be the relation bridging these levels of  reality. But it’s not just the 
dependence between physical entities that grounding links, it’s also taken to 
connect other dependencies as well, for example the dependence of  truth on 
being, whole on parts, sets upon members, and the mental on the physical. 
These dependencies are importantly different from causal dependencies since 
they are synchronical. Take the truth of  the sentence <Socrates exists> as an 
example. The truth of  the sentence depend on the existence of  Socrates, but 
this isn’t a temporal relation. It’s not the case that Socrates comes to existence 
prior to the sentence being true, and so the dependence between them cannot 
be causal dependence, and can therefore not be explained causally. This is a 
powerful reason to recognize grounding as a dependence relation (Schaffer, 
2016a).  
If  we believe there to be a genuine kind of  dependence different from 
causal dependence, what might its features be? Let’s revisit the example with 
singleton Socrates from 3.1. We had an explanation stating that {Socrates} 
existed because Socrates did, and that there was a dependence between them. 
The dependence cannot be underwritten with causality, for it is not the case 
that Socrates is coming to existence prior to {Socrates}, and so it seems more 
plausible to say that Socrates makes {Socrates} exist. To put this constitutive 
dependence in grounding terms: Socrates grounds {Socrates}. This means 
that grounding is asymmetric, for if  Socrates makes {Socrates} exist, it cannot 
be right that {Socrates} makes Socrates exist. Grounding also appears to be 
irreflexive, since {Socrates} isn’t making {Socrates} exist. For transitivity, let’s 
say that if  {Socrates} is grounded in Socrates, and Socrates is grounded in 
particles arranged Socrates-wise, {Socrates} is (at least partially) grounded in 
particles arranged Socrates-wise.  So the explanation ‘{Socrates} exists 19
because Socrates exists’ is backed with grounding, which means, just as in the 
case when causal explanation was backed with causation, that the entities 
 There are, however, arguments that grounding is neither irreflexive (Jenkins, 2011) or 19
transitive, (Schaffer, 2012). There is even an argument suggesting that grounding lacks a 
structural partial order altogether (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2015).
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involved (sets, Socrates, and particles) in the grounding relation have 
explanatory value. Consequently, the Explanatory principle states that the 
entities involved should be considered as existing.  
The conclusion that abstracts entities, such as sets, must be considered as 
existing might worry friends of  the Eleatic principle, or anyone else who 
accepts ontological parsimony as a theoretical virtue. Such worries can, I 
think, be dissolved. Alongside a strict partial ordering, grounding is often 
thought to be well-founded, so that x is fundamental iff  nothing grounds x.  20
This means that we can make a distinction between fundamental entities and 
derivative entities, where the latter are grounded in the former. Derivative 
entities owe their existence to the fundamental entities in which they are 
grounded. Those who are reluctant to the idea of  letting abstract entities 
figure in ontology can simply try to make the case that no abstract entities are 
fundamental.  
But the whole point of  introducing grounding in the first place was to have 
more relations that could back explanations, so there is at least some ontological 
cost involved, given that grounding itself  isn’t an analyzable concept 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005, Schaffer, 2009). One way to mitigate this worry is to 
point to all the theoretical benefits of  grounding, providing some perspective to 
the ontological price-tag. This strategy is basically to choose explanatory power 
over ontological parsimony. Another strategy is to argue that grounding is a 
type of  causation - metaphysical causation - in which case our ontology 
wouldn’t expand at all when accepting grounding, but merely add explanatory 
value. Pointing to such an argument will make up the last section of  this paper. 
4 .    GROUN DI N G A S M E TA PH YSI C A L CAU SAT I O N  
In this section I entertain the possibility that grounding is a kind of  causation, 
where causation is to be understood as a genus level notion. This kind of  
unionism is explicitly proposed by Wilson (2016), and Schaffer (2016a) suggests 
 Although, there are those who think that grounding can survive the loss of  well-20
foundedness. See for example Bliss (2013).
NE W ELEAT IC I SM !15
SI MON ALL ZÉ N
that there is a striking structural analogy between the two.  I will simply 21
outline the idea as they understand it, suggesting that it provides an interesting 
position if  we take ontological parsimony seriously. Following Wilson, I will for 
the remainder of  this paper refer to causation as a genus level notion while 
treating grounding and nomological causation as species thereof. ‘Nomological 
causation’ will denote what ‘causation’, usually denotes. Note however that 
Schaffer disagrees with Wilson and takes the two to be separate, so when I say 
that they agree about some analogy between grounding and nomological 
causation, have this distinction in mind, appearances notwithstanding. The 
consequence of  accepting Wilson’s position is that, when accepting the 
Explanatory principle, our ontological commitments are equal to those of  the 
Eleatic principle, but we get far more explanatory power. 
4 .1    STRUCTURAL A NA LO G Y  
The first immediate, but perhaps circumstantial, analogy between nomological 
causation and grounding is the ‘producing’ or ‘generative’ feature they appear 
to have. They both structure reality in some sense, where an effect can be seen 
as the product of  its nomological cause, and the grounded as a product of  its 
grounds. As we have seen in section three, they also appear to connect 
similarly to dependence, where the effect depend on its nomological cause and 
the grounded depend on its grounds: the breaking of  the window depended on 
the throwing of  the rock, and the existence of  {Socrates} depended on the 
existence of  Socrates. The first is an instance of  dependence by nomological 
causation and the latter of  dependence by grounding. We also saw that both 
grounding and nomological causation was irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive, 
a view which both Schaffer and Wilson hold (Schaffer, 2016, p. 55, Wilson, 2016, 
p. 5-6). According to Wilson, arguments against the strict partial order of  
grounding are closely related to arguments against the strict partial order of  
nomological causation, which he interprets as further support of  the analogy 
between them. If  it, for example, turns out that grounding isn’t transitive (see 
 Others have suggested causation to be a type of  building relation, so perhaps grounding is 21
the genus level notion under which causation is a species. For such an account see Bennett 
(2011).
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Schaffer 2012), such a conclusion would plausibly target the transitivity of  
nomological causation as well (Wilson, 2016, p. 6-8). 
Both Schaffer and Wilson agrees on the deeper consequence of  nomological 
causation and grounding sharing a strict partial order: grounding and 
nomological causation both allow an application of  the type/token distinction 
where instances, or tokens, of  the relation naturally generalize to types. Schaffer 
pushes the analogy of  component vs net distinction, and the tripartite distinction 
between incomplete and complete factors for cause, where the equivalent for ground 
is partial and full factors, with total factors covering both. Further analogies include 
the two relations aptness in screening off  relations and structural equations models.  22
Furthermore, both Schaffer (2016a) and Wilson (2016) argue that nomological 
causation and grounding stand in a similar relation to a surrounding metaphysical 
notion relevant for explanation - laws. Instances of  nomological causation are 
governed by laws of  nature, where instances of  grounding are governed by 
metaphysical principles, suggesting (in Schaffer’s terms) non-accidental 
generalization. This means that the generalizations are backed with ‘formative 
principles - whether laws of  nature or laws of  metaphysics’ (Schaffer, 2016, p. 57). 
Wilson argues that this is the only distinction between nomological causation and 
grounding - that different laws are invoked when explaining why a certain 
dependency holds. To explain grounding dependence, laws of  metaphysics would 
be cited, and when explaining causal dependence, laws of  nature would be cited 
(Wilson, 2016, p. 23). 
I’m listing these analogies without explication for reasons of  space and for the 
fact that they are not directly relevant to my point. The reason I am listing them 
at all is because they make up a substantial part of  the argument suggesting a 
tight connection between grounding and nomological causation. What I want to 
do is to assume these claims of  analogy and propose a possible upshot for the 
ontological commitments of  the Explanatory principle. The upshot is that, even 
though grounding can back explanation and the Explanatory principle tells us 
that we should accept entities in such grounding relations, the grounding relation 
 The analogy in structural equation models plays a significant role for both Schaffer and 22
Wilson, where the success of  grounding ‘surviving’ a formal treatment designed for causation 
is seen as proof  of  the two relations similarity or, in Wilson’s case, unity. 
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itself  wouldn’t be an ontological burden - its simply a species of  the single 
primitive causation.  23
Despite arguing for the tight connection between causation and grounding, 
Schaffer is more cautious about collapsing the two in the unionist schema 
proposed by Wilson. Even so, Schaffer admits to the allure of  unionism:  
Indeed, given the depth of  the analogy it is actually a substantive and 
difficult question as to whether there is any more than a nominal 
distinction between grounding and causation, and I am open to […] the 
idea that there is a single unified relation of  generation called ‘causation’ 
when it drives the world through time, and ‘grounding’ when it drives the 
world up levels. (Schaffer, 2016a, p. 59) 
Given that Schaffer and Wilson’s arguments about the striking analogies between 
nomological causation and grounding holds some truth, this seems to be a 
promising view to adopt if  we want to accept the Explanatory principle but still 
minimize our ontological commitments. My intention for this section was never 
to argue in favor of  this position as such, but only to present a possible way in 
which we can avoid extra ontological commitment. As such, this section is 
intended as a response to those worried that the Explanatory principle might be 
overly inclusive when accepting grounding as an extra primitive.  
5 .    CONCLUSION &  SU M M A RY 
In this paper, I have argued for two things: (1) that the Eleatic principle cannot 
be justified by claiming that only causal entities have explanatory value, and (2) 
that we should accept a principle determining the existence of  entities in terms 
of  their explanatory value. In section one I introduced the Eleatic principle 
and a particular justification for it - that only causal entities have explanatory 
value. In section two, I argued against this justification by showing that non-
causal explanations, and non-causal entities, non-trivially contributes to 
 This might look like a reduction of  grounding to causation, so one might think that the 23
Eleatic principle is true after all. This is mistaken. ‘Causation’ here is taken to include cases of  
metaphysical causation (or grounding) excluded in ‘causation’ as used in the Eleatic principle. 
Furthermore, there might be more dependencies than causal and grounding that can back 
explanation. Mathematical and logical dependencies are two additional candidates for backing 
explanation, and so even if grounding could be reduced to causation, that would not be a 
decisive argument against the Explanatory principle. 
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complete scientific explanations. In section three I presented an alternative 
principle conditioning the existence of  postulated entities on their explanatory 
value. This principle took the intuitive pull of  the Eleatic justification seriously, 
while not arbitrarily restricting explanatory value to causal entities. I presented 
a theory of  explanation, and that dependencies back explanation. A suggested 
followed that, in addition to causation, grounding was part of  the dependency 
relations that could back explanation. This had the consequence that the 
Explanatory principle would rule some abstract entities as existing. I argued 
that if  this was worrisome, a feature of  grounding - well-foundedness - could 
be used to classify abstract entities as derivatively existing, as opposed to 
existing fundamentally.  
In the last section, I gave a response to a worry about the ontological cost of  
introducing grounding as a new primitive. The response consisted in 
presenting a view which proposed that grounding was a species of  causation - 
metaphysical causation. This view had the benefit of  cutting the ontological 
cost of  accepting grounding alongside causation, since both would be instances 
of  only one primitive, without loosing any explanatory value. 
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